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Abstract 
 
In recent years, a number of researchers have examined the existence and source of shareholder wealth effects 
around announcements of international joint ventures. The results of these studies are mixed with no clear 
answers as to when and why investors attach value to firms using joint ventures to enter overseas markets. In 
this context, we examine the shareholder wealth effects for 92 international joint venture announcements made 
by  Australian  firms  during  June  1988  -  December  1997.  We  find  that,  on  average,  shareholders  of  firms 
announcing joint ventures realize an abnormal return of +1.65% over the two-day announcement period of days 
(-1, 0). We also find that the wealth gains are much higher for international joint ventures undertaken in high-
risk  countries  versus  low-risk  countries.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  the  theory  that  international  joint 
ventures can be structured in ways that allow the foreign partner to protect itself against expropriation risk and 
hence increase their value to shareholders. 
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1.  Introduction  
 
In recent years, international joint ventures have become prominent vehicles for accessing foreign markets. An 
international joint venture typically involves two or more parties from different countries bringing together their 
tangible  and  intangible  resources,  setting  up  a  new  venture,  and  agreeing  to  share  the  profits  through  a 
contractual agreement. Typically, the resulting joint venture is located in the country of one of the partners.  
 
Hennart (1991) argues that the rationale  for entering  into joint venture agreements can be explained using 
transactions  costs  theory.  According  to  this  theory,  joint  ventures  are  efficient  when  two  conditions  are 
simultaneously  met.  First,  the  markets  for  intermediate  goods  such  as  know-how,  raw  materials,  parts  and 
components, etc.,  held by each party are  failing. Second, acquiring or replicating the assets  yielding these 
intermediate goods is more expensive than obtaining rights to utilizing them through a joint venture agreement.  
 
The major benefit of joint ventures is that the contributors of intermediate inputs get a claim on any residuals. 
This theory implies that international joint ventures would be undertaken when other modes of entry such as 
direct foreign investments and corporate acquisitions are costlier. However, there are also costs associated with 
entering into international joint ventures. Since the joint venture parties get claims to a fraction of the residuals, 
there are incentives for one party to take actions that would maximize its own gains at the expense of other joint 
venture partners.
1 There could also be conflicts in the areas of profit reinvestment rates, growth of the venture, 
and inter-firm pricing. Hence, the efficiency of a joint venture depends on the convergence of the goals of the 
parties to the agreement as well as the degree to which their actions can be controlled through pre-written 
contracts.  
 
Beamish (1985) compares joint ventures in developing countries and developed countries and shows that there 
are significant differences in the reasons for undertaking the joint venture as well as differences in their success 
rates.  He  finds  that  almost  60%  of  joint  ventures  in  developing  countries  are  undertaken  as  a  result  of 
government policies, while the rest are undertaken because the joint venture parties require the technical skills 
or assets of each other. On the other hand, in developed countries 83% of the joint ventures are undertaken 
because  the  joint  venture  parties  require  the  technical  skills  and  assets  of  each  other,  while  the  rest  are 
undertaken as a result of government policies. Beamish also finds that the performance of 61% (36%) of the 
joint ventures in developing (developed) countries is unsatisfactory once they are undertaken. 
 
The above findings show that joint ventures have their advantages as well as problems such as high failure rates, 
especially  when  undertaken  in  developing  countries.  Hence,  it  is  not  clear  whether  announcements  of 
international joint ventures will result in wealth gains or losses to the shareholders of firms announcing them. 
Further, many joint ventures are undertaken in countries where firms face varying degrees of risk and it is 
important to examine whether investors view joint ventures in high-risk countries differently from joint ventures 
in low-risk countries. 
 
Based on the above discussion, we argue that international joint ventures are valued more by investors when 
they are undertaken in countries with a high degree of political risk. To support this argument, we rely on the 
property rights theory of joint ventures and show that firms will prefer international joint ventures when entering 
high-risk countries. We also show that the wealth gains associated with announcements of international joint 
ventures can be attributed to the political risk of the country where the joint venture is undertaken.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide details of the property rights theory 
of international joint ventures and review the main previous literature related to examining the wealth effects of 
international joint ventures. Section 3 provides details of the data and method used. A discussion of the results is 
presented in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Related Previous Literature 
 
2.1.  Political Risk and the Form of International Expansion 
 
Political risk can be defined as risk arising in countries where politicians can broker wealth transfers among 
various groups confronting differential transaction costs. Individuals negotiate private contracts for the exchange 
of goods and services and changes in property rights can result in wealth transfers if these private contracts 
                                                            
1  For example, the local partner may be able to mimic the technology provided by the foreign partner and use 
it outside the joint venture.  
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cannot be costlessly renegotiated. The wealth transfers will depend on the extent to which these contractual 
obligations persist even though they are no longer mutually advantageous under the new set of property rights. 
If property rights are weak and easily manipulated, individuals would enter into shorter term contracts to avoid 
wealth transfers. In this respect, joint ventures are well-suited as investment vehicles because they provide for 
shared ownership with recontracting clauses.  
 
Using this framework, Phillips-Patrick (1991) argues that foreigners who typically face high political transaction 
costs will tend to use joint ventures more often, and will be more likely to negotiate for options to dissolve the 
arrangement and provide for equitable payment in liquid assets upon the termination of such agreements.  
 
Under the property right theory of organizational form,  assets that  have  substantial politically expropriable 
quasi-rents are more likely to be jointly owned if property rights are weak. For example, Fama and Jensen 
(1983) argue that differential contracting costs will influence the choice of organizational form. If the flow of 
services from certain assets is difficult to measure and price, profit-sharing through international joint ventures 
can help reduce the agency costs of separate ownership and lower the political risk of owning local assets. In 
that case, the local partner would provide more country-specific assets while the foreign partner would provide 
the more intangible assets such as technology or managerial expertise.  
 
The  major  advantage  of  using  joint  venture  arrangements  when  political  risk  is  high  is  that  joint  venture 
contracts provide for the control, monitoring and recontracting mechanisms that would provide a means to 
redress unforeseen shifts in local business conditions and the political environment. Such contracts provide for 
elaborate specifications of termination or dissolution clauses that, in turn, provide a fair price to the partner 
electing to dissolve the agreement with payment typically being made in cash.  
 
To summarize, international joint venture agreements provide a contractual means of exploiting firm-specific 
assets while permitting rapid recontracting or termination, if necessary. Hence, investors should attach at higher 
value to firms entering into countries with high political risk via joint ventures because this organizational form 
allows entering into a new market with the least risk. 
 
2.2.  Wealth Effects of International Joint Ventures 
 
Previous researchers have examined the wealth effects of international joint venture announcements with mixed 
results.  This  research  has  focused  on  identifying  the  existence  of  shareholder  wealth  effects  for  firms 
announcing international joint ventures, and the factors that help explain the cross-sectional variations in these 
wealth effects. For example, Lummer and McConnell (1990) analyze 416 international joint ventures involving 
firms in 55 countries during 1971-80. They find that announcements of joint ventures involving foreign firms 
positively affect the US partner’s market value, and that this effect is directly related to the amount of the 
foreign investment. In contrast, they  find no  market reaction to announcements of joint ventures involving 
foreign governments. Also, they find no significant abnormal returns associated with US firms involved in joint 
ventures in politically risky less developed countries. 
 
Lee and Wyatt (1990) examine the wealth effects of 109 international joint ventures announced by US-based 
firms during 1974-86. Contrary to Lummer and McConnell (1990), they find that while the overall abnormal 
return reaction to joint ventures with foreign firms is negative, joint ventures with firms in less developed 
countries result in non-negative abnormal returns. They argue that the overall negative market reaction is due to 
firms overinvesting in assets that expand corporate wealth and increase managerial entrenchment at the expense 
of shareholder wealth. Consistent with these findings, Chung, Koford and Lee (1993) find that international 
joint ventures announced by US-based firms during 1969-89 are associated with negative abnormal returns 
earned by the US partner. They also find that the market’s valuation of joint venture announcements is not 
related to the economic status of the host country or the industry involved.  
 
Previous  researchers  have  also  examined  the  shareholder  wealth  effects  of  joint  ventures  with  partners  in 
specific countries. For example, Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991) analyze joint ventures in China announced by 73 
US-based firms during 1979-90 and find a significantly positive abnormal return to the US partner. They also 
find that the abnormal returns are inversely related to the size of the foreign investment, not related to firm size, 
or to the US partner’s prior presence in China. Crutchley, Guo, and Hansen (1991) examine joint ventures 
between US and Japanese firms and find that the US partner earns significantly positive abnormal returns over 
the announcement period. They also find that a size effect exists with higher abnormal returns observed for 
smaller US firms signing joint ventures with larger Japanese partners. Etebari (1993) examines the valuation 
effects of joint ventures announced by 29 US-based firms in eastern and central European countries during  
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1988-91 and finds that, on average, these joint ventures are associated with significantly positive abnormal 
returns over a two-day announcement period. Finally, Janakiramanan, Lamba and Seneviratne (1999) study the 
wealth effects of 87 domestic joint ventures and 90 international joint ventures announced by Australian firms 
during 1988-96. They find that while there are no significant abnormal returns associated with domestic joint 
venture  announcements,  international  joint  ventures  provide  shareholders  of  Australian  partners  with 
significantly positive abnormal returns. 
 
To summarize, previous research shows that the results of studies on international joint ventures are, at best, 
mixed with no clear evidence as to whether these joint ventures are wealth-enhancing investments. Researchers 
finding  positive  wealth  effects  argue  that  they  are  due  to  the  synergistic  effects  of  these  joint  ventures. 
Conversely,  researchers  finding  negative  wealth  effects  argue  that  they  are  due  to  the  “empire-building” 
tendencies of managers who are undertaking non-positive NPV investments overseas. 
 
In addition, researchers analyzing the shareholder wealth effects of international joint ventures in markets with 
high political risk have either adopted broad classifications of developing and developed markets to categorize 
this risk, or examined joint ventures in specific developing countries. Clearly,  not all developing countries 
necessarily have high country risk, and this country risk is not necessarily the same across these developing 
countries. Some developing countries, such as Singapore or Hong Kong provide for a relatively safe investment 
environment while other countries, such as those in the African region are considerably more risky. In this 
paper, we do not rely on the developed/developing markets classification to proxy for country risk. Instead, we 
use country credit risk ratings to separate countries into high and low risk markets.
2 Using this classification we 
examine the relationship between country risk and joint ventures in overseas markets. Specifically, we examine 
whether investors attach a higher value to firms entering into international joint ventures in high-risk countries 
compared to low-risk countries as this organizational form allows firms to minimize their risk of entering high-
risk markets.  
 
3.  Data and Method 
 
3.1.  Data 
 
Our initial sample contains all international joint venture announcements during June 1988 - December 1997 by 
firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). Data on joint venture announcements are obtained from 
the ASX DataDisc, which contains detailed descriptions of all announcements made by publicly-listed firms 
trading on the ASX. The sample was filtered using the guidelines shown in the Appendix resulting in a final 
sample  of  74  publicly-listed  firms  involved  in  92  international  joint  ventures.  Data  on  dividends  and 
capitalization-adjusted  prices  for  individual  firms  and  data  for  the  market  proxy,  the  All  Ordinaries 
Accumulation  Index,  are  obtained  from  Datastream.  Data  on  country  risk  ratings  are  obtained  from  the 
Institutional Investor's Semiannual Survey of Bankers.
3 
 
Table 1 provides a detailed description of the 92 international joint ventures announced in terms of the year of 
announcement,  overseas  partner,  industrial  classification,  firm  size,  and  the  degree  of  foreign  involvement. 
Around two-thirds of the joint ventures are announced during 1993-96, and over 70% of the joint ventures are 
located in developing countries, mainly in the Asian region (Panels A and B). Although we do not find a 
concentration of joint ventures by type of industry, over 25% of the joint ventures are announced by gold mining 
firms (Panel C). 
 
{Insert Table 1 around here} 
 
Panel D of the table shows the distribution of the firms announcing joint ventures based on size, industry, 
country risk, prior presence, and the degree of multinationalism. It is interesting to note that large firms are 
typically  involved  in  industrial  joint  ventures  while  smaller  firms  generally  focus  on  joint  ventures  in  the 
resources sector. Large firms also have higher multinational exposure and generally have prior experience in the 
country where the joint venture is located. Further, almost two-thirds of the joint ventures in high-risk countries 
are located in the resources  sector,  whereas three-quarters of the joint  ventures in the industrial  sector are 
located  in  low-risk  countries.  A  majority  of  firms  entering  into  resources  sector  joint  ventures  have  prior 
                                                            
2  Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1995) suggest that country credit risk ratings can be used to provide an effective 
measure of country risk. 
3  The country risk rating represents the risk of doing business in that country and is based on an index ranging 
from 0 to 100 with higher rated countries receiving higher scores.  
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experience in that country, while a majority of firms entering into industrial sector joint ventures have no prior 
experience in that country. 
   
Table  2  presents  some  summary  statistics  on  the  firms  announcing  international  joint  ventures.  Firms 
announcing joint ventures are generally large with a median book value of assets of $3.5 billion and median 
sales of $2.9 billion. However, the median investment and the ratio of investment to total assets are relatively 
low, with a median investment of $20.8 million and a median ratio of 1%. The standard deviation and quartiles 
show the diversity in firm size. These summary statistics imply that the Australian partners tend to contribute 
more in terms of intangible assets, such as technology and know-how, while the local partners tend to be the 
main contributors of tangible assets. 
 
{Insert Table 2 around here} 
 
3.2.  Event Study Method 
 
We  use  the  standard  event  study  method  to  measure  the  abnormal  returns  earned  by  firms  announcing 
international joint ventures. The date of the joint venture announcement is taken as the event date and defined as 
day 0. Given that the exact event date is not always accurately known, we opt to base our analysis on a two-day 
announcement  period.
4  In  addition,  we  also  examine  the  behavior  of  the  average  abnormal  returns  and 
cumulative abnormal returns over a longer 21-day event window of days (-10, +10). The market model is 
estimated as, 
 
  jt mt j j jt R R ε β α + + = ,  (1) 
 
where Rjt is the observed daily return for firm j on day t, Rmt is the observed daily return on the market index on 
day t, αj is the estimate of firm j’s intercept, βj is the estimate of firm j’s beta, and εjt is the residual error term. 
The estimates for αj and βj are based on the returns over days (-200, -30) relative to the announcement day using 
the Scholes and Williams (1977) adjustment for nonsynchronous trading. Firm j’s abnormal return on day t is 
computed as, 
 
 
mt j j jt jt R R AR β α ˆ ˆ − − = .  (2)
 
 
Next, we compute the average abnormal return on day t as, 
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∑
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(3) 
 
where Nt is the number of firms with non-missing abnormal returns on day t. Finally, the cumulative abnormal 
returns over a window of days (-t, +t) is computed as, 
 
  ∑
+
− =
+ − =
t
t k
k t t AAR CAR , .
 
(4) 
 
To examine the wealth effects of the announcement of international joint ventures, we test the hypothesis that 
the average abnormal returns over any day or that the cumulative abnormal return over any given time interval 
equals zero. The test statistic is constructed as a ratio of average abnormal returns (or cumulative abnormal 
returns) to the standard error of that series. To check whether outliers may be affecting our results we also use a 
binomial sign test, which examines whether the proportion of positive abnormal returns is statistically different 
from those during the estimation period.
5 
 
                                                            
4  In some cases, the actual announcement date may have been made on day -1, but may have been reported on 
day 0. 
5  The  t-statistic  for  the  sign  test  is  computed  as  (p  -  nr)/[n(1  -  r)r]
1/2  where  p  is  the  number  of  positive 
abnormal returns on day t, n is the total number of firms with non-missing abnormal returns on day t, and r is 
the fraction of positive abnormal returns during the estimation period.  
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To study the effects of country risk, we construct two sub-samples based on firms announcing international joint 
ventures in markets categorized as having high and low country risk, respectively. Joint ventures announced in 
markets with a country risk rating below (above) 50 are classified as being high (low) risk joint ventures. For 
each sub-sample, the average abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns are computed in the same way 
as for the full sample. Next, a difference of means test is conducted to examine whether the average abnormal 
returns and the cumulative abnormal returns are significantly different for the high and low country risk sub-
samples.  
 
3.3.  Multivariate Analysis  
 
Since earlier studies have found that the firm size, industry classification, degree of multinationalism, and prior 
presence  in  a  market  potentially  have  an  impact  on  the  abnormal  returns,  we  use  these  factors  as  control 
variables and include country risk as an additional variable in a multivariate regression framework. This analysis 
involves running a series of regressions taking the following general form: 
 
  CARj = β0 + β1 LSIZE j + β2 INDj + β3 MULTIj + β4 CRATEj + β5 PRIORj + εj ,
 
(6) 
 
where CARj is two-day announcement period cumulative abnormal return for firm j; LSIZEj is the natural log of 
the total book value of assets of firm j; INDj is a dummy variable with a value 1 if the joint venture is in the 
resources  sector  and  0  if  the  joint  venture  is  in  the  industrial  sector;  MULTIj  is  a  measure  of  firm  j’s 
multinational presence based on the Herfindahl index with values between 0 and 1 with lower values indicating 
a higher level of multinationalism; CRATEj is the credit rating of the country in which firm j announces a joint 
venture and scaled between 0 and 100 where a higher value indicates a higher credit rating and lower risk; and 
PRIORj is a dummy variable with value 1 if the firm already has a prior presence in the country where joint 
venture is to be located and 0 otherwise. 
 
4.  Empirical Results and Analysis  
 
4.1.  Overall Effect of Joint Venture Announcements 
 
Table  3  presents  the  results  for  the  average  abnormal  returns  and  cumulative  abnormal  returns  around 
international joint venture announcements for the full sample over the event window of days (-10, +10). Panel A 
of the table shows the average abnormal returns and the corresponding t-statistics, the percentage of positive 
abnormal returns, and the cumulative abnormal returns and the corresponding t-statistics. Panel B of the table 
shows the cumulative abnormal returns for selected periods over the event window. 
 
The recorded announcement day average abnormal return is +0.83%, but is found to be statistically insignificant 
(Panel A). However, the abnormal return on day -1 of +0.81% is statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
cumulated abnormal return over the two-day announcement period is +1.65%, which is statistically significant 
at the 1% level (Panel B). Over the longer event window of days (-2, +2) the cumulative abnormal returns are 
+2.5% and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
{Insert Table 3 around here} 
 
We also report the percentage of positive abnormal returns to determine whether the reaction to international 
joint venture announcements is a consistent phenomenon across all firms, or whether some outlier firms may be 
driving  our  results.  On  day  -1  we  find  that  67.5%  of  the  abnormal  returns  are  positive  and  statistically 
significantly different from the percentage of abnormal returns during the estimation period. That is, over two-
thirds of the firms react positively to joint venture announcements. Over the announcement period of days (-1, 
0)  we  find  56.6%  of  the  firms  experiencing  positive  cumulative  abnormal  returns,  but  this  figure  is  not 
statistically significant.  However, over the  longer event  window of days (-2, +2) almost 62% of the  firms 
experience positive cumulative abnormal returns, and this figure is statistically significant at the 5% level. These 
findings  suggest  that  outliers  are  not  driving  our  results.  Overall,  we  find  that  international  joint  ventures 
enhance shareholder wealth, and that this revaluation effect is permanent over the event window. 
 
To  examine  the  relationship  between  political  risk  and  the  wealth  effects  of  international  joint  venture 
announcements, we group the firms into joint ventures announced in markets characterized as having high and 
low country risk, respectively. Countries with a credit risk rating lower (higher) than 50 are classified as having 
high (low) country risk. The average abnormal returns, cumulative abnormal returns and the difference between 
these abnormal returns are presented in Table 4.  
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{Insert Table 4 around here} 
 
We  find  that  for  firms  entering  into  international  joint  ventures  located  in  high-risk  countries  the  average 
abnormal returns on days -2, -1 and 0 are +2.38%, 1.17% and 0.64%, respectively, with day -2 being statistically 
significant at the 5% level (Panel A). Over days (-1, 0) and days (-2, +2) the cumulative abnormal returns are 
+1.81% and 4.20%, respectively, and are both statistically significant at the 5% level, or better (Panel B). The 
average  abnormal  returns  for  firms  entering  into  joint  ventures  in  low-risk  countries  are  also  positive  but 
generally not significant over days (-1, 0) or days (-2, +2). Comparing the cumulative abnormal returns we find 
that the abnormal returns for firms announcing joint ventures in high-risk countries are significantly higher than 
for firms announcing joint ventures in low-risk countries over the entire event window. Figure 1 graphs the 
cumulative abnormal returns for the full sample and the high and low country risk sub-samples. The figure 
clearly shows that international joint ventures in high-risk countries are significantly more highly valued by 
investors than international joint ventures in low-risk countries. 
 
{Insert Figure 1 around here} 
 
As noted earlier, a majority of the joint ventures in high-risk countries are in the resources sector where the 
political risk tends to be substantially higher. These findings show that firms do take country risk into account 
when making a decision on the type of industry to target as well as the organizational form they should adopt in 
a particular market. 
 
4.2.  Multivariate Regression Results 
 
Panel A of Table 5 shows the results of the regressions used to test the relationship between the shareholder 
wealth effects of international joint ventures and country risk, after controlling for the effects of other variables. 
We report the results for stepwise regressions where each potential explanatory variable enters the regressions 
one at a time. The dependent variable in all the regressions is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-1, 0).  
 
{Insert Table 5 around here} 
 
Our results show that the coefficient for country risk is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, or 
better, after controlling for the effects of other variables.
6 This shows that firms entering into international joint 
ventures in high-risk countries are valued more by investors than firms entering in joint ventures in low-risk 
countries. 
 
We also find some interesting relationships between the cumulative abnormal return over days (-1, 0) and the 
different attributes of the international joint ventures examined.
7 For example, we find a significant negative 
relationship between the cumulative abnormal return and firm size, which is similar to the findings for US-based 
firms announcing international joint ventures. The cumulative abnormal return is also significantly negatively 
related to the degree of multinationalism of the Australian partner, and moderately positively related to its prior 
experience. Lastly, the market’s valuation of international joint ventures is not related to the type of industry. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we examine whether political risk affects the wealth gains accruing to shareholders of firms 
announcing international joint ventures. Using the event study method we examine the wealth effects for 92 
international joint venture announcements made by 74 Australian firms during June 1988 - December 1997. We 
find that, on average, shareholders of firms announcing international joint ventures realize an abnormal return of 
                                                            
6  The order of the country risk variable is not important since it remains statistically significant regardless of 
the order in which it enters the regressions. 
7  Panel B of Table 5 shows the correlation coefficients between these independent variables. We find that firm 
size and industry type are negatively correlated implying that small (large) firms tend to undertake joint 
ventures  in  the  resources  (industrial)  sector.  The  correlation  between  industry  type  and  country  risk  is 
positive indicating that joint ventures in the resources sector are usually undertaken in high-risk countries. 
We also find a significant negative correlation between prior experience and the degree of multinationalism 
implying that firms with a higher level of multinationalism tend to have a prior presence in a particular 
market. In general, however, these correlations are not very high for multicollinearity among the independent 
variables to be of concern.  
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+1.65% over the two-day announcement period of days (-1, 0). The sources of these  wealth  gains can be 
attributed to firm size, the degree of multinationalism, and the country risk of the market where the joint venture 
is located. In general, the wealth gains are much higher when international joint ventures are undertaken in high-
risk  countries  versus  low-risk  countries.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  the  theory  that  international  joint 
ventures can be structured in ways that allow the foreign partner to protect itself against expropriation risk and 
hence increase the shareholder value more than for firms undertaking joint ventures in low-risk countries. 
 
Appendix: Criteria Used to Screen International Joint Venture Announcements 
 
1.  The firm making the joint venture announcement must be traded on the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) during the sample period. 
 
2.  The firm must be trading immediately around the announcement and must have been trading for at least 
200 days prior to the announcement date to facilitate the estimation of the market model parameters. 
 
3.  The  joint  venture  announcement  must  be  distinct  from  other  announcements,  so  that  there  are  no 
confounding announcements around the event date or in the event window. 
 
4.  The announcement must be the first announcement conveying information about the joint venture. The 
announcement information must contain the exact date on which the announcement is made. 
 
5.  The joint venture announcement must provide the nationality of the partners and whether the partner is 
a government entity or a private firm. 
 
6.  The assets of the joint venture must be in a foreign country. 
 
7.  If the joint venture is executed via a subsidiary, the parent company must have control of the entity, 
where control is defined according to Australian accounting standards. 
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Table 1: Frequency Distribution of International Joint Ventures Announced by Australian Firms During 
June 1988 - December 1997 
 
Panel A: Frequency Distribution by Year of Announcement 
 
Year  Frequency   Percent 
1988  0  0.0 
1989  0  0.0 
1990  5  5.4 
1991  5  5.4 
1992  4  4.4 
1993  16  17.4 
1994  29  31.5 
1995  16  17.4 
1996  16  17.4 
1997  1  1.1 
Total  92  100.0 
 
Panel B: Frequency Distribution according to the Home Country of the Overseas Partner  
 
Overseas Partner  Frequency   Percent 
China  18  19.6 
India   5  5.4 
Indonesia  15  16.3 
Malaysia   7  7.6 
Thailand   3  3.3 
Vietnam   5  5.4 
Other Emerging  14  15.2 
    Total Emerging  67  72.8 
New Zealand  5  5.4 
Singapore  3  3.3 
United Kingdom  6  6.5 
USA  6  6.5 
Other Developed  5  5.4 
    Total Developed  25  27.2 
Total  92  100.0 
 
Panel C: Industrial Classification of the Australian Joint Venture Partner 
 
Industry  Frequency   Percent 
Energy, Oil and Gas   4   4.4 
Engineering   3  3.3 
Diversified Industrial   10  10.9 
Food & Household   9   9.8 
Gold   24  26.1 
Miscellaneous Industries   4   4.4 
Miscellaneous Services   5   5.4 
Other Metals/Minerals 
Other 
 10 
 13 
10.9 
14.1 
Total    92  100.0  
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Table 1 (Continued)  
 
Panel D: Distribution of Firms According to Firm-Specific Variables
a  
 
       
Firm Size 
 
Industry 
 
Prior Experience 
 
Country Risk 
Degree of 
Multinationalism 
      Large  Small  Resources  Industrial  Yes  No  High  Low  High  Low 
      (46)  (46)  (34)  (58)  (62)  (30)  (41)  (51)  (46)  (46) 
Firm Size  Large  (46)  46  -  7  39  30  16  9  37  31  15 
  Small  (46)  -  46  27  19  32  14  32  14  15  31 
Industry  Resources  (34)  7  27  34  -  21  13  23  11  18  16 
  Industrial  (58)  39  19  -  58  41  17  18  40  28  30 
Prior   Yes  (62)  30  32  21  41  62  -  27  35  36  26 
Experience  No  (30)  16  14  13  17  -  30  14  16  10  20 
Country  High  (41)  9  32  23  18  27  14  41  -  32  9 
Risk  Low  (51)  37  14  11  40  35  16  -  51  9  42 
Degree of   High  (46)  31  15  10  16  24  2  12  14  46  - 
Multinationalism  Low  (46)  15  31  14  10  6  18  16  8  -  46 
 
a Firm size is proxied by the total book value of assets of the firm announcing the joint venture. Firms are classified as having previous experience if they had previously 
announced an international joint venture. Firms are classified as operating in markets with high (low) country risk based on whether the country risk rating of that market 
is below (above) 50. Firms are classified as having a high (low) degree of multinationalism if the Herfindahl index is below (above) 0.5.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample of Australian Firms 
 
   
Mean 
 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
First 
Quartile 
Third  
Quartile 
Total Assets (millions)  $3,517.4  $2,307.1  $4,347.4  $275.5  $5,749.5 
Total Sales (millions)  $2,905.0  $2,201.9  $3,025.6  $268.0  $4,782.1 
Australian Investment (millions)
*  $58.0  $20.8  $88.6  $12.4  $57.7 
Investment/Total Assets (%)
*  28.6  1.0  112.0  0.3  1.8 
Foreign Assets/Total Assets (%)  37.0  31.7  30.2  9.9  60.0 
Percentage of Subsidiaries Overseas  14.4  9.6  14.7  5.7  19.3 
 
* Figure based on a sub-sample of 35 firms that announced the amount of investment in the original announcement. 
Notes:  
Total Assets = Total book value of assets taken from the last annual report prior to the joint venture announcement.  
Total Sales = Total sales from the last annual report prior to joint venture announcement.  
Australian Investment = The total investment announced by the Australian joint venture partner. 
Investment/Total Assets = The ratio of the total investment announced by the Australian joint venture partner to the book value of 
assets. 
Foreign Assets/Total assets = The ratio of the Australian joint venture partner’s total foreign assets to the book value of assets. 
Percentage of Subsidiaries Overseas = The number of subsidiaries incorporated in countries other than Australia divided by the total 
number of subsidiaries included in the Australian partner’s consolidated accounts.  
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Table  3:  Summary  of  Average  Abnormal  Returns  and  Cumulative  Abnormal  Returns  for  the  Full 
Sample of International Joint Ventures During June 1988 - December 1997 
 
Panel A: Average Abnormal Returns Over Days (-10, +10)  
 
 
Event Day 
Average 
Abnormal Return 
 
t-statistic 
 
Percent Positive 
Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
 
t-statistic 
-10  -0.511  -1.377  50.7  -0.511  0.151 
-9  -0.208  0.981  44.2  -0.719  -0.110 
-8  -0.157  -0.573  50.7  -0.876  -0.273 
-7  -0.284  -0.986  48.1  -1.160  -0.520 
-6  0.351  1.380  49.4  -0.809  -0.188 
-5  -0.139  -0.740  42.9  -0.948  -0.323 
-4  -0.102  -0.354  50.7  -1.050  -0.399 
-3  0.160  0.449  49.4  -0.890  -0.214 
-2  0.292  1.401  53.3  -0.598  0.022 
-1  0.813  3.382
***  67.5
***  0.215  0.640 
 0   0.833  1.387  52.0  1.048  1.307 
+1  1.149  1.689
*  57.1  2.197  1.899
* 
+2  -0.547  -1.226  45.5  1.650  1.461 
+3  -0.257  -0.546  57.1  1.393  1.297 
+4  0.186  0.703  54.6  1.579  1.518 
+5  -0.091  -0.222  48.1  1.488  1.455 
+6  0.252  0.641  58.4  1.740  1.762
* 
+7  -0.165  -0.402  49.4  1.575  1.490 
+8  -0.036  -0.156  49.4  1.539  1.476 
+9  0.049  0.163  54.6  1.588  1.546 
+10  -0.167  -0.392  48.1  1.421  1.327 
 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Selected Periods Around Days (-10, +10) 
 
Event  
Day(s) 
Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
 
t-statistic 
 
Percent Positive 
(-1, 0)  1.646  2.691
***  56.6 
(-2, +2)  2.540  3.127
***  61.8
** 
(-5,+5)  2.297  1.678
*  52.3 
(-10, +10)  1.421  0.390  51.3 
 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4: Summary of Average Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Difference in Abnormal Returns for High and Low Country Risk 
Samples  
 
Panel A: Average Abnormal Returns and Differences in Abnormal Returns for High and Low Country Risk Samples  
 
  High Country Risk Sample 
(N = 41) 
Low Country Risk Sample  
(N = 51) 
Difference in High and Low 
Country Risk Samples 
 
 
Event Day 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
 
 
Percent Positive 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
 
 
Percent Positive 
 
 
Difference 
 
 
t-statistic 
-10  0.392  0.392  52.1  -0.020  -0.020  42.0  0.412   0.838 
-9  1.208  1.600  41.4  -0.427  -0.447  43.6  1.635   1.730
* 
-8  0.193  1.793
*  48.7  -0.248  -0.695  58.9  0.441   0.697 
-7  -0.908  0.885  51.5  -0.733  -1.428  37.8
*  -0.175  -0.597 
-6  -1.413  -0.528  43.7  -0.490  -1.918
**  65.8
**  -0.923   -1.150 
-5  1.179  0.651  46.2  0.431  -1.487  47.3  0.748   0.967 
-4  0.621  1.272  54.2  0.060  -1.427  46.8  0.561   0.763 
-3  -0.425  0.847  48.3  0.107  -1.320  56.6  -0.532   -1.029 
-2  2.381
**  3.228
***  49.9  0.067  -1.253  68.7
***  2.314   2.718
*** 
-1  1.174  4.402
***  76.8
***  -0.116  -1.369  69.3
***  1.290   2.180
** 
 0   0.635  5.037
***  51.2  0.420  -0.949  78.5
***  0.215   0.458 
+1  -0.248  4.789
***  56.8  0.191  -0.758  50.2  -0.439   -0.596 
+2  0.260  5.049
***  43.0  -0.258  -1.016  63.2
*  0.518   0.904 
+3  -0.843  4.206
***  59.6  0.392  -0.624  56.4  -1.235   -1.623 
+4  0.853  5.059
***  58.7  -0.054  -0.678  48.7  0.907   1.327 
+5  0.207  5.266
***  52.4  -0.401  -1.079  42.4  0.608   0.865 
+6  -1.625  3.641
***  57.2  -0.203  -1.282  56.8  -1.422   -1.751
* 
+7  -0.195  3.446
***  42.3  0.306  -0.976  56.9  -0.501  -0.787 
+8  -1.274  2.172
**  49.8  -0.226  -1.202  47.2  -1.048   -1.467 
+9  -0.527  1.645
*  52.7  0.450  -0.752  56.4  -0.977  -1.390 
+10  -1.067  0.578  50.2  -0.382  -1.134  54.3  -0.685   -0.904  
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Differences in CARs for Selected Periods Around Days (-10, +10) 
 
  High Country Risk Sample 
(N = 41) 
Low Country Risk Sample  
(N = 51) 
Difference in High and Low Country 
Risk Samples 
 
Event Days 
Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
 
t-statistic 
Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
 
t-statistic 
 
Difference 
 
t-statistic 
(-1, 0)  1.809  2.078
**  0.304  0.975  1.506  1.628 
(-2, +2)  4.202  4.672
***  0.303  0.936  3.899  4.079
*** 
(-5, +5)  5.795  6.826
***  0.839  2.657
***  4.956  5.472
*** 
(-10, +10)  0.578  0.725  -1.134  -3.657
***  1.713  2.001
** 
 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table  5:  Cross-Sectional  Regressions  of  the  Two-Day  Cumulative  Abnormal  Returns  on  Selected  Explanatory  Variables  for  Australian  Firms  Announcing 
International Joint Ventures During 1988-97
a  
 
Panel A: CARj = β0 + β1 LSIZE j + β2 INDj + β3 MULTIj + β4 CRATEj + β5 PRIORj + εj 
 
Regression  β β β β0  β β β β1  β β β β2  β β β β3  β β β β4  β β β β5  N  Adjusted-R
2  F-Statistic 
1 
0.016 
(2.86)
*** 
-0.010 
(-4.64)
***          92  0.225  21.5
*** 
(0.0000) 
2 
0.015 
(1.22) 
-0.010 
(-4.61)
*** 
0.034 
(1.96)
*        92  0.225  10.6
*** 
(0.0001) 
3 
0.015 
(1.22) 
-0.010 
(-4.57)
*** 
0.019 
(1.15) 
-0.019 
(-2.45)
**      92  0.225  8.1
*** 
(0.0003) 
4 
0.063 
(3.18)
*** 
-0.014 
(-5.67)
*** 
0.012 
(1.02) 
-0.018 
(-2.39)
** 
-0.079 
(-2.99)
***    92  0.312  7.0
*** 
(0.0000) 
5 
0.093 
(2.11)
 ** 
-0.015 
(-5.97)
*** 
0.009 
(0.89) 
-0.016 
(-2.25)
** 
-0.065 
(-2.36)
** 
0.008 
(1.77)
*  92  0.373  5.6
*** 
(0.0000) 
 
Panel B: Correlation Coefficients Between Independent Variables
 
 
  INDj  CRATEj  PRIORj  MULTIj 
LSIZEj 
-0.467
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.138 
(0.218) 
-0.101 
(0.370) 
-0.433
*** 
(0.000) 
INDj    0.332
*** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.996) 
-0.058 
(0.607) 
CRATEj      0.047 
(0.676) 
-0.103 
(0.479) 
PRIORj        0.396
** 
(0.028) 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
a Notes:  
  CARj = The two-day cumulative abnormal return over days (-1, 0) relative to the announcement day. 
  LSIZEj = The natural log of the total book value of assets of the Australian joint venture partner. 
  INDj = A dummy variable that equals 1 if the joint venture is in the resources sector and 0 if it is in the 
industrial sector. 
  MULTIj = A measure of the Australian joint venture partner’s multinational presence based on the 
Herfindahl index which takes a value between 0 and 1 with a lower value indicating a higher degree of 
multinationalism. 
  CRATEj = The country risk rating based on an index of 0 to 100, where a higher value indicates a 
higher rating and lower country risk. 
  PRIORj = A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm already has a prior presence in the country where 
the joint venture is located and 0 otherwise. 
  The numbers in parentheses for coefficient estimates are t-statistics and the numbers in parentheses for 
F-statistics and correlation coefficients are p-values. 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Full Sample and High and Low Country Risk Samples of Firms 
Announcing International Joint Ventures During 1988-97
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